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THE CONUNDRUM OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Mark J. Loewenstein*
Much of the scholarship on executive compensation that ap-
pears in law reviews assumes that large U.S. corporations
overpay their chief executive officers ("CEOs"). This assump-
tion is understandable, as many of these compensation pack-
ages are indeed stunning. The question of whether CEOs are
overpaid, however, is complicated. Some scholars in other dis-
ciplines, principally in economics and management science,
have studied the issue but, as this Article demonstrates, this lit-
erature does not confirm the assumption. Indeed, some studies
suggest that CEO pay is competitive. Moreover, efforts to re-
duce the level of executive compensation may have the unin-
tended consequence of achieving the opposite result. Thus, those
seeking to rein in compensation should proceed with caution.
This Article concludes with some thoughts on a methodology for
further research.
Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. The author
wishes to thank his colleague, Professor Dale Oesterle, for his comments on an
earlier draft of this Article and Margaret Leary of the University of Michigan
Law Library for her research assistance. The author was a visiting professor of
law at the University of Michigan during the preparation of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
Executive compensation' is like global warming; true believers
and doubters are sharply arrayed against one another debating
whether there is a problem and, if so, what are its causes and cures.
Some observers believe that the compensation paid to America's top
executives is clearly excessive, while others doubt that a problem
exists.3 The doubters may point to the large pool of potential execu-
tives and the companies bidding for their services and conclude that
the free market fixes compensation. The free market analysis also
notes the wealth of information available about compensation and
the talents and experience of the executives who receive that com-
pensation. Under this analysis, the market for chief executives is
large, active, and informed, and executives are not overpaid.4
On the other hand, those who believe that executives are "over-
paid" may point to numerous studies that suggest the lack of rela-
tion between executive compensation and corporation performance
and argue that, unless there is such a relation, the executives' com-
pensation cannot be justified.5 They also point to the compensation
1. As used in this essay, the term "executive compensation" refers to the
pay of the highest paid executive officer of a corporation, generally its chief ex-
ecutive officer ("CEO"). I use the terms "executive compensation" and "CEO
compensation or pay" as synonyms.
2. The proponents for this side of the debate are more numerous. One of
the leading critics of executive compensation is Graef S. Crystal, who writes and
speaks regularly on the subject. For a statement of his case, see generally
GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF ExCESs: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN
ExEcuTIvEs (1991). Derek Bok, former President of Harvard University takes a
somewhat broader view of the matter and notes that excess is not limited to
corporate executives. DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT: How EXECUTIVEs AND
PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID AND How IT AFFECTS AMERICA (1993).
3. See, e.g., Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set
CEO Pay? The Press? Congress? Shareholders?, HARV. Bus. REv., May-June
1992, at 28; Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel They Get,
HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 125.
4. See, e.g., Robert Thomas, Is Corporate Executive Compensation Exces-
sive?, in THE ATrACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA 276, 278 (M. Bruce Johnson ed.,
1978) ("Competition among corporations . . . sets the level of executive com-
pensation."); Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 959, 975-78 (1980) (stating "excessive" compensation is eliminated by
market forces, including competition for executive positions).
5. The leading study is by Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, Per-
formance Pay and Top Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990)
[hereinafter Jensen & Murphy, Performance Pay]. See also Michael C. Jensen
& Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It Is Not How Much You Pay, But How,
HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1990, at 138 [hereinafter Jensen & Murphy, CEO
Incentives]; Graef S. Crystal, CEOs and Incentives: The Myth of 'Pay for Per-
formance'. L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at D1. More recent studies suggest a
stronger link between pay and performance, especially among IPO companies.
See, e.g., Malcolm Baker & Paul A. Gompers, An Analysis of Executive Com-
pensation, Ownership, and Control in Closely Held Firms (March 1999) (un-
published manuscript), available in Social Science Electronic Publishing, Social
Science Research Network (visited Feb. 14, 2000) <http://www.ssm.com/paper.
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of foreign executives, who, on average, earn considerably less than
U.S. CEOs, 6 and to the structural aspects of corporate boards that
might bias compensation upward.7
This debate has raged on for nearly two decades--a period that
has seen the compensation of the CEOs of large U.S. companies in-
crease from 42 times the compensation of their labor force to 419
times.9 In the interim, there have been two modest legal reforms
that some thought might have an effect on executive compensation.0
What effect these reforms have had is difficult to determine; suffice
it to say, executive compensation has not declined in response to
them. At the same time, scholars have explored a number of theo-
ries to explain executive compensation and suggested a number of
solutions to improve the way CEOs are compensated.1
This Article reviews and evaluates the principal empirical and
theoretical issues surrounding executive compensation, looking at
various, and sometimes competing, theories. Its conclusion may be
somewhat surprising, particularly at a symposium devoted to dis-
taf?ABSTRACT_ID=165173> (finding that, in the sample, the level of pay sensi-
tivity is 50 times higher than in the 1990 Jensen and Murphy study).
6. A recent study undertaken jointly by The Conference Board and Monks
Partnership Limited examined compensation practices in 2169 companies in
the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and France in 1997. See
CHARLES A. PECK ET AL., ToP EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: CANADA, FRANCE, THE
UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES 7 (The Conference Board 1999). The
study found that the United States had the highest total current compensation
(salary and annual bonus) at 573,000 euros (approximately $550,000 on July
15, 1999, when the study was published) followed by the United Kingdom
(470,000 euros), Canada (355,000 euros), and France (227,000 euros). See id. at
5. If the study had included long-term incentive compensation, the differential
between the United States and the other countries would have been greater.
7. See, e.g., ROBERT A.G. MONK & NELL MINOW, POWER AND ACCOUNT-
ABILITY (1991) (discussing foreign comparisons); Charles M. Elson, Executive
Overcompensation-A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. REV. 937 (1993) (ex-
amining structural problems).
8. See Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Mar-
kets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 232 (1983) (indicating that a new wave of
concern about the generosity of management compensation may be on the way);
see also Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1933) (showing that executive
compensation has seen controversy in the past, with the issue finding its way to
the United States Supreme Court).
9. See Tim Smart, Pay Gap Between Workers, Execs Widens in '90s, ANN
ARBOR TImEs (Mich.), Aug. 30, 1999, at A12 (citing the sixth annual survey of
executive compensation by the Institute for Policy Studies and United for a Fair
Economy).
10. See infra notes 115-148 and accompanying text.
11. See generally IRA T. KAY, VALUE AT THE TOP: SOLUTIONS TO THE
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CRISIS (1992) (recommending a comprehensive com-
pensation program that focuses on increasing the CEO's equity interest through
stock purchases and options); Mark A. Clawson & Thomas C. Klein, Indexed
Stock Options: A Proposal for Compensation Commensurate with Performance, 3
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 31 (1997) (noting the shortcomings of traditional stock
options and recommending the indexing of options).
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cussing executive compensation: current research simply does not
support the conclusion that, on average, the CEOs of large U.S.
companies are overpaid. Thus, measures to "rein in" compensation
are ill-advised and possibly counter-productive. In light of the vari-
ous conundrums presented by the debate over executive compensa-
tion, this Article concludes with a suggested method of research that
might prove more enlightening.
I. ARE AMERICAN CEOs OVERPAiD?
No serious consideration of solutions to the "problem" of execu-
tive compensation should proceed before determining whether, in
fact, CEOs are overpaid. Many articles and books simply assume
that to be the case, in part because the data regarding CEO pay
seems so compelling. 12 The conclusion that U.S. CEOs are paid ex-
cessively is generally based on one or more of these arguments: first,
that the differential between CEO pay and that of blue collar work-
ers has increased "exponentially" in the past two decades;13 second,
that U.S. CEOs earn dramatically more than their counterparts in
Europe and Japan, who head companies that compete with U.S.
firms;14 and third, that CEO pay is not correlated to corporate per-
formance, particularly increases in shareholder wealth. 5 Overlay-
ing all of these arguments is the structural argument-corporate
boards are "captured" by the CEO and thus incapable of bargaining
with the CEO. Under this scenario, CEOs use their leverage over
these captive boards to extract excessive compensation.16 These ar-
guments do not, however, prove the premise, no matter how force-
hilly (or indignantly) they are stated.
A. Comparisons with Rank and File Workers and Foreign CEOs
The first two arguments are not persuasive, and for similar rea-
sons. Much of the increase in CEO pay is directly attributable to the
increase in stock prices over the past two decades, as the portion of
12. See, e.g., CRYSTAL, supra note 2, at 27 (citing facts that indicate that,
while the pay of an average American worker has decreased significantly over
the past twenty years, the compensation for a typical company's CEO has in-
creased threefold); Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and
Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 649 (1995) ("In the United States to-
day, many corporate executvies are paid much more than their performance
seems to justify."); Elson, supra note 7, at 945-49 (providing a typical analysis
in which Professor Elson addresses the question by asserting that directors on
the typical board are beholden for their positions to the CEO, with whom they
must negotiate, and therefore, are incapable of engaging in meaningful negotia-
tions).
13. See Smart, supra note 9, at A12.
14. See Vagts, supra note 8, at 232.
15. See William A. Dimma, What's Fair Pay for Senior Executive?, TORONTO
STAR, Aug. 27, 1999, at 1.
16. See id.
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CEO pay in stock options has risen dramatically in the past several
years. 7 Had the stock market declined over this period, the change
in the differential between CEO and average worker compensation
would look quite different, as the average worker is not paid in stock
options. Similarly, stock options have not been common overseas."
One compensation consultant has noted that CEO pay differences
are not that dramatic between Europe and the United States unless
long-term incentives-typically stock options-are taken into ac-
count.'9 In other countries, various obstacles, including unfavorable
tax treatment, have limited the use of stock options as compensa-
tion.0 More importantly, whether comparison is to the average
worker or the foreign CEO, neither of these arguments addresses
the normal market forces, either as they affect the average worker
or as they affect U.S. and foreign CEOs.
One legitimate question in this area, rarely considered in refer-
ence to CEO pay, is why the wages of average workers have risen so
slowly. The answer, of course, relates to the supply and demand for
workers. Less skilled workers are increasingly competing with
workers in foreign countries, where wages are low. This has re-
duced the bargaining power of U.S. workers to demand wage in-
creases, as such workers face the threat of plant closings or techno-
logical replacement. While a more thorough analysis of this
question is beyond the scope of this Article, there is little dispute
that economic forces are holding down the wages of the average
worker relative to CEO pay.2' These same economic forces may ex-
plain the rise in CEO pay, as the demand for highly skilled corpo-
17. See Clawson & Klein, supra note 11, at 42 (citing FREDERICKW. COOK &
Co., INC., LONG-TERM AND STOCK-BASED GRANT PRACTICES FOR ExEcuTIVEs AND
DIRECTORS 5 (1996), which reported that 94% of the nation's 250 largest compa-
nies compensate their executives with stock options).
18. See Shirliey Fung, How Should We Pay Them?, ACROSS THE BOARD,
June 1999, at 37, 38.
19. See id. at 37 (quoting Robert Freedman of the New York-based con-
sulting firm Towers Perrin); see also PECK ET AL., supra note 6, at 22 & 41 (con-
cluding that, in terms of salary, United States and United Kingdom compensa-
tion was nearly equal); Richard Morals et al., The Global Boss' Pay: Where (and
How) the Money Is, FORBES, June 7, 1993, at 93 (pointing out that a 1992 Tow-
ers Perrin study indicated that Brazilian and Mexican CEOs earn the highest
cash compensation globally).
20. See PECK ET AL., supra note 6, at 7 (describing, in the discussion of each
country, the tax and regulatory considerations). But see David Cay Johnston,
American-Style Pay Moves Abroad, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 3, 1998, at C1 (noting that
the use of options abroad is increasing); Luisa Kroll, Warning: Capitalism Is
Contagious, FORBES, May 18, 1998, at 220, 221 (stating that two Towers Perrin
surveys revealed a jump in the number of incentive and option plans offered by
international manufacturers); Deborah Orr, Damn Yankees, FORBES, May 17,
1999, at 206, 207 (pointing out that European companies are reluctantly
adopting stock option plans).
21. See Gene Marlowe, Wage Gap Continues to Mystify, RICHMOND TIiEs-
DISPATCH, May 2, 1998, at C1.
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rate chieftains may be outstripping the supply. Indeed, recent sto-
ries in the Wall Street Journal note the extreme shortage of talent
in this market.22 Notably, while CEO pay has risen much faster
than the pay of average workers, CEO pay has risen much slower
than the pay of professional athletes. During the period 1980-95,
the pay of the average worker increased 60%, that of CEOs 380%,
National Basketball Association players 640%, National Football
League players 800%, and Major League Baseball players 1000%.23
Again, market forces are likely at work in all cases.
When comparing pay across borders, one must consider first
that, outside of the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, data
on executive pay is very difficult to obtain and comparisons often
depend on estimates.24 Of equal importance, critics of CEO pay
rarely discuss many factors that may account for pay disparities.
For instance, German companies may pay executives a second sal-
ary in a tax haven, which is not reported.u In many countries over-
seas, perquisites are an important component of compensation and
do not appear on comparison tables.26 In addition to their monetary
value, perquisites may have an important non-monetary component.
For instance, Japanese executives place a greater value than U.S.
CEOs on the prestige of being a chief executive and, therefore, may
be willing to accept a lower salary.27 Similarly, tax rates and pur-
chasing power vary from country to country and should be consid-
ered in cross-country comparisons.
B. Comparisons with Corporate Performance
The final argument-that CEO pay is not correlated to per-
formance-is the most forceful of these arguments, but it is still un-
persuasive as a basis to conclude that CEOs are overpaid. Part of
the problem in this area relates to what constitutes "performance."
Critics of CEO pay tend to compare changes in CEO pay to changes
in shareholder wealth, that is, dividends paid and increases in share
22. See generally Joann S. Lublin, To Find CEOs, Web Firms Rev Up
Search Engines: In the Big Race to Go Public, Too Many Dot-Coms Chase Too
Few Star Executives, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1999, at B1 (noting that there is a
huge demand for CEOs among Internet companies).
23. See JAY W. LoRsCH, COMPENSATING CORPORATE CEO's: A PROCESS VIEW
fig. II (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 99-013, 1998).
24. See PECK ET AL., supra note 6, at 8 (relying on survey data and inter-
views to supply French data); see also Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executive Re-
wards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States,
102 J. POL. ECON. 510, 533 (1994) (stating that there is not as much evidence of
management compensation for Japan as there is for the United States).
25. See Morais et al., supra note 19, at 90.
26. See W. Liebtag, Compensating Executives: The Development of Respon-
sible Management, in EXECUTiVE COMPENSATION: A STRATEGIC GUIDE FOR THE
1990S 30 (Fred K. Foulkes ed., 1991).
27. See Morais et al., supra note 19, at 98.
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prices.2 8 There is some logic to this comparison, as increasing share
prices are the primary way that shareholders can benefit from their
investments and, therefore, the CEO should be focused on that
goal.29  On the other hand, CEOs have no control over the stock
market, which is affected by factors such as general economic condi-
tions, politics, and a wide array of other factors." Consequently,
firms often correlate CEO pay to other performance measures, such
as profits, return on equity, earnings per share, etc., that the CEO
and management team presumably can influence.3' In the long
term, achieving these financial goals should redound to the benefit
of shareholders, but, given the vagaries of the stock markets, these
accomplishments might not be immediately reflected in share
32prices.
In addition to oversimplifying the pay-performance issue, critics
often explain increases in CEO pay as a function of the tendency of
compensation committees to rely on salary surveys and peg the pay
of their CEO in the top quadrant of the survey." This practice re-
sults in a "ratcheting up" effect as firms leap frog one another in
fixing pay. 4 Critics then argue that the market becomes distorted
and that pay is more rational if related to performance, again nar-
rowly defined." While the use of salary surveys seems to be wide-
28. This comparison is ubiquitous and is the premise of the oft-cited work
by Professors Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay, supra
note 5, at 226. See also CRYSTAL, supra note 2, at 96-109 (arguing that execu-
tives are over compensated in relation to stock performance); Jeffrey Kerr &
Richard A. Bettis, Boards of Directors, Top Management Compensation, and
Shareholder Returns, 30 ACAD. MGMT. J. 645, 658 (1987) ("In general, boards
of directors do not consider performance of a firm's stock when changing CEOs'
salaries and bonuses. Neither overall market movements nor abnormal returns
were associated with adjustments in compensation .... At worst, results sug-
gest that boards ignore their responsibility to shareholders. .. ").
29. Or, as Professors Jensen and Murphy put it, "[it is appropriate.., to
pay CEOs on the basis of shareholder wealth since that is the objective of
shareholders." Jensen & Murphy, Performance Pay, supra note 5, at 226.
30. A substantial portion of the fluctuation of a security's value cannot be
linked to its intrinsic value. See Vagts, supra note 8, at 243.
31. See LORSCH, supra note 23, at 20; see also John R. Deckop, Determi-
nants of Chief Executive Compensation, 41 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 215, 224-25
(1988) (finding in a study "that among firms of equal size (measured by sales),
CEO compensation tends to increase directly with profits").
32. Critics of the practice of basing CEO compensation on the achievement
of financial performance objectives point out that the wrong incentives are cre-
ated thereby because CEOs are discouraged from downsizing firms when that
would be in the best interests of the shareholders and, coincidentally, of the
economy. See Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensa-
tion, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 713, 721-25 (1995).
33. See CRYSTAL, supra note 2, at 222-23.
34. See Edward M. Iacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Com-
pensation, 48 U. TORONTO L.J. 489, 511 (1998).
35. See id. at 510-11.
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spread and their effect inflationary,3' as a practical matter, boards
and compensation committees cannot set pay without regard to the
pay of executives in comparable firms. Relying, at least in part, on
pay surveys accommodates a firm's important motivational, re-
cruitment, and retention concerns.3 Moreover, critics assume that
use of the surveys results in an increase in compensation that oth-
erwise would not have occurred. 38  There is, however, reason to
doubt this. The theory suggests that, in the absence of surveys, di-
rectors would bargain harder with the CEO, with the result of lower
compensation, and that surveys somehow make the directors less ef-
fective bargainers.39 The executive finding himself or herself below
the median may be motivated to seek higher compensation, but then
why is the board not similarly motivated to hold down compensation
when it discovers it is paying well above the median? Finally, ex-
ecutive pay has informational attributes: in light of disclosure, a
firm may wish to convey information about its success or prospects
through its CEO pay."
More to the point, much of the dramatic increase in CEO com-
pensation is a direct result of the increase in incentive compensation
in the form of stock options,42 which, in turn, were implemented by
corporate boards in response to demands that CEO compensation be
more closely linked to shareholder returns.43 This linkage is a justi-
fied measure to address the agency cost that shareholders otherwise
bear: corporate executives have natural incentives to devote less
than their greatest efforts to corporate business and to consume
more leisure and other perquisites than is in the best interests of
shareholders.44 Aligning executive and shareholder interests re-
duces this agency cost and provides a justification for granting large
stock options to executives.45
36. See, e.g., LoRscH, supra note 23, at 17; Mahmoud Ezzamel & Robert
Watson, Market Comparison Earnings and the Bidding-Up of Executive Cash
Compensation: Evidence from the United Kingdom, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 221, 226
(1998).
37. See CRYSTAL, supra note 2, at 223; Iacobucci, supra note 34, at 511.
38. See Iacobucci, supra note 34, at 504.
39. See id. at 512-17.
40. See id. at 513.
41. See id. at 512-17.
42. See Jennifer Reingold & Ronald Grover, Executive Pay: Special Report,
BusINEss WEEK, Apr. 19, 1999, at 74 (stating that, in 1998, exercised options
accounted for 80% of reported CEO pay, up from 72% just a year earlier).
43. See id. at 72, 73.
44. The leading academic work on agency theory is Michael C. Jensen and
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 313 (1976).
45. See id. at 308. There is evidence that the stock market views favorably
the implementation of stock plans designed to address agency cost problems.
See, e.g., James A. Brickley et al., The Impact of Long-Range Compensation
Plans on Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. AccT. & EcoN. 115 (1985). The incentive ef-
fects of stock options also have some empirical support. See Hamid Mehran,
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While generous stock plans are not the only means to reduce
agency costs, they do provide some unique efficiencies.46 An alterna-
tive is to more closely monitor corporate executives; the board, pre-
sumably, could do this. Indeed, in other countries, boards commonly
monitor their executives more closely, with Germany and Japan fre-
quently cited as examples.47 The corporate directors in these coun-
tries, however, tend to have a stake in closer monitoring-they rep-
resent significant shareholders or lenders (in the case of Germany)48
or have other relationships that motivate them to assure the success
of the corporation on whose board they sit (as in Japan).49 In con-
trast, directors in the United States do not have such a stake and,
instead, often have no affiliation with the companies they direct
other than their directorships. 0 Thus, to be successful, corporations
needed to develop a substitute to close monitoring. Two such alter-
natives, which are not mutually exclusive, have emerged: long-term
incentive compensation schemes and the market for corporate con-
trol.
The use of long-term compensation schemes, which are designed
to align CEO and shareholder interests, may be inexpensive relative
to the alternatives. To be sure, shareholders do sacrifice equity in
the corporation, and there is some indication that this sacrifice is
becoming material, a problem which is discussed below.51 However,
Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance, 38 J.
FiN. ECON. 163, 179-80 (1995) (finding that firms that pay executives in stock
tend to have higher returns); see also Robert T. Masson, Executive Motivations,
Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance, 79 J. POL. ECON. 1278, 1278-79
(1971) (finding that "firms with executives whose financial interests are more
closely parallel to the goals of the stockholders and the long-run profitability of
the firm do indeed outperform other firms in stock return").
46. The grant of the option does not require the firm to expend any cash,
and the firm might reasonably expect that the option will provide a perform-
ance incentive to the executive. Options granted with an exercise price equal to
market price on the date of the grant do not generate taxable income to the re-
cipient, nor does the grant generate an expense item to the firm. As a result of
recent rules, however, the firm must disclose the estimated value of the option
in a footnote to its financial statements. See Pat McConnell, Employee Stock
Option Expense Pro Forma Impact on EPS and Operating Margin, BEAR
STEARNS EQUITY RESEARCH, May 1, 1998, at 2.
47. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and
Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the
United States, 48 STAN. L. REv. 73, 81 (1995).
48. See generally David Charny, The German Corporate Governance Sys-
tem, 1 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 145 (1988) (comparing and contrasting the German
and American models for corporate governance systems).
49. See generally Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japa-
nese Firm, 28 J. ECON. LIT. 1 (1990) (discussing the internal structure of Japa-
nese firms); Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring
and Control in Japan, 11 J. ECON. BEHAv. & ORG. 399 (1989) (discussing how
Japanese banks internalize the monitoring and control functions of the external
capital market).
50. See Elson, supra note 7, at 981.
51. See infra notes 65-81 and accompanying text.
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if the CEO's compensation scheme does not provide the right incen-
tives, the board must somehow be motivated to provide the close
monitoring that would serve as a substitute, and that would come at
a cost. Charles Elson has suggested that this motivation could be
provided if individual directors had significant stock ownership in
the companies they direct.52 If implemented, such a proposal would
give directors the sort of motivation that, presumably, would drive
German directors to undertake effective monitoring and that, pre-
sumably, would bring U.S. executive compensation in line with that
of foreign companies.
Elson's proposal, however, is costly. He acknowledges that di-
rectors would have to receive "substantial" stock ownership 3 and as-
sumes that five years' worth of director fees paid in stock "should" be
enough.54 However, judging how much stock is sufficient and
whether stock acquired by the director in partial payment of a direc-
tor's fee has the same motivational effects as stock purchased by the
director is difficult. As to the former, a director with a multimillion-
dollar portfolio of his or her own may not be highly motivated to en-
hance the value of $175,000 worth of stock to $250,000. In addition,
all of the directors would have to receive substantial amounts of
stock. The aggregate of these stakes may well exceed the stake that
would properly motivate the CEO to perform in the shareholders' in-
terests. Put differently, minimizing agency costs is not free, and a
properly structured executive compensation package may be the
least expensive means of accomplishing it.
More fundamentally, the important empirical question is the
relationship between firm performance and ownership structure. If
the board owns a significant stake in the firm, intuitively it would
have incentives to monitor effectively. However, those incentives
might be offset by an entrenchment effect. Indeed, one study found
that firm value initially rises with increases in inside ownership and
then falls, presumably due to the entrenchment effect.5 One recent
empirical study, examining the relationship between corporate gov-
ernance, executive pay, and firm performance was unable to find
evidence that greater equity ownership by outside directors results
in improved governance systems." There does not appear to be a
great deal of empirical work in this area, and recent studies have
52. Elson, supra note 7, at 981.
53. Id. at 985.
54. Id. at 986.
55. See Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership and Market Valua-
tion: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 311-12 (1988).
56. See John E. Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer
Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 404 (1999). The
authors used eight measures as proxies for effective governance, such as
whether the CEO was also board chair, the portion of directors who are outside
and independent, and the number of other boards on which directors served.
See id. at 381-82.
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mixed results.57 Thus, one might conclude that, even if greater di-
rector ownership of stock helped reduce executive compensation, it
might be inadvisable because of the potentially adverse effect on
firm value.
The alternative to a properly structured long-term incentive
plan and active board-based monitoring is an active market for cor-
porate control; that is, monitoring by the market. If a corporation
is under-performing in the product market, or inefficiently employ-
ing its capital, this should be reflected in its stock market price. In
theory, therefore, the market for corporate control would act as a
monitor of excessive compensation. If resources are wasted on ex-
ecutive compensation, fewer resources are devoted to generating in-
come and profits, and the corporation should be vulnerable to a
takeover. 9 There are several reasons why the market for corporate
control is not a viable option, however. First, the amounts devoted
to CEO compensation are, on average, immaterial. For instance,
Kevin Murphy calculated that, in 1992, the 1000 largest U.S. corpo-
rations, whose total market capitalization was $3.4 trillion, paid
their CEOs a total of $2.2 billion.0 Had these CEOs worked without
compensation that year, shareholder returns, which averaged 24%,
would have increased by only 0.06 percentage points.6' This sort of
increase in returns would hardly justify a 30-40% premium over
market price, which is typical in a hostile tender offer.
Second, the barriers in the market for corporate control are sub-
stantial. The financial, legal, regulatory, and other expenses of a
takeover are considerable. Judicial approval of poison pills and
other corporate-developed defenses to takeovers,6 combined with
widespread adoption of state antitakeover statutes, have made cor-
porations much less vulnerable to hostile takeovers than they were
in the 1980s.6 3 Finally, it is somewhat ironic to think of a takeover
bid being motivated by a perception that the corporation can be op-
erated more efficiently with a "cheaper" CEO. Indeed, the opportu-
nity to receive a generous compensation package often motivates (at
least in part) a takeover and justifies the premium the purchaser is
57. See id. at 373-75 (collecting studies).
58. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Con-
trol, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965).
59. See id. at 113.
60. Murphy, supra note 32, at 726.
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1150-51 (Del. 1989) (holding that the defensive measures that Time had em-
ployed to avoid a lucrative offer from Paramount were proper).
63. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987)
(giving state anti-takeover laws a boost by the United States Supreme Court
decision); see also Amanda Acquisitions Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877
F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding a Wisconsin statute that "provides for al-
most hermetic separation of bidder and target for three years after the bidder
obtains 10% of the stock-unless the target's board consented before then").
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willing to pay. In any case, the amount that can be saved in CEO
compensation, standing alone, is unlikely to justify the considerable
expenses of such a transaction.6
In sum, it would appear that performance-based pay plans that
compensate managers with stock or stock options are an appropriate
way to address the agency problem and award performance. Not
surprisingly, such plans have become increasingly popular but with
a downside risk that has been noted only recently: the amount of
equity that is being acquired by management is reaching troubling
proportions.6 A 1997 study by the consulting firm of Pearl Meyer &
Partners determined that officers and directors of the 200 largest
U.S. firms held, on average, shares and options (including options
authorized but not yet granted) equal to 11.9% of the outstanding
shares." A year later, the same firm found that the figure had in-
creased to 13.2% of corporate equity, or around $1.1 trillion." Most
of these option grants are awarded to the top managers in the form
of "mega-options," which, if exercised, would be worth at least $10
million.' In some firms, particularly in the high tech area, the por-
tion of shares allocated to managers in options threatens to shift
control to them. "
In addition to the potential dilution to public shareholders and
the possibility of shifting control to managers through options, cur-
rent trends in the awarding of options pose other problems. Current
accounting rules do not require a charge against earnings upon the
award of these options.0 Hence, profits are overstated and, to the
extent compensation plans provide bonuses and even additional op-
tion awards tied to profits, the efficacy of the plans is compromised.
To avoid potential dilution, some corporations have been funding op-
tion plans with repurchased shares.71 While this does avoid dilution,
it has the effect of increasing management's stake in the firm.
Given the large size of the options, for some firms the cash expendi-
tures are material, diverting resources from profitable projects or
64. See Vagts, supra note 8, at 239-40.
65. See Richard H. Wagner & Catherine G. Wagner, Recent Developments
in Executive, Director, and Employee Stock Compensation Plans: New Concerns
for Corporate Directors, 3 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 5, 5-7 (1997) (noting that
nearly all large firms currently have such plans); Share and Share Unalike,
ECONoMIsT, Aug. 7, 1999, at 18 (asking if options are encouraging management
to act in ways that may leave everyone worse off).
66. See Wagner & Wagner, supra note 65, at 10 (citing PEARL MAYER &
PARTNERS, EQUITY STAKE 1996, EQUITY PARTICIPATION IN THE TOP 200 (1996)).
67. See Share and Share Unalike, supra note 65, at 18.
68. See id.
69. See Wagner & Wagner, supra note 65, at 10 (citing RADFORD
AssocIATEs/A&AGG, RADFORD EXEcUTIVE REPORT (1996)).
70. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays of Warren Buffet: Lessons for
Corporate America, 19 CARDozo L. REv. 5, 160 (1997).
71. See Wagner & Wagner, supra note 65, at 17.
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dividends or increasing firm borrowings.72 In some instances, the
share repurchases may materially increase the market price of the
securities, which, ironically, may trigger the exercise of more op-
tions.73
The stock option phenomenon has another, subtler aspect. If
managers hold the shares that they acquire, they can more easily
become entrenched in office, a consequence the public shareholders
would like to avoid. More importantly, with so much capital in-
vested in a single firm, managers may also become more risk-averse.
This, also, is not in the interest of public shareholders, who are
likely to hold a diversified portfolio and, therefore, are not risk-
averse with respect to any particular investment. On the other
hand, if managers sell the stock that they acquire on exercise of op-
tions or hedge their investment positions,7 4 then an important justi-
fication for stock options is lost because the managers' interests no
longer are aligned with the shareholders'. These are knotty prob-
lems with no clear and easy answers. What does seem clear, how-
ever, is that political solutions are unlikely to match the most effi-
cient economic solutions. The latter evolve over time as firms adjust
their practices to take into account experience gained. The former,
like the tax initiative described below, are less adaptable to change
and run the risk of becoming outmoded and difficult to change.
The rush to stock options may reflect corporate responses to po-
litical pressures, and not necessarily the right responses. A recent
study by Professor Murphy, for instance, concluded that "there is
surprisingly little direct evidence that higher pay-performance sen-
sitivities lead to higher stock performance."76 The empirical evi-
dence is mixed on whether contingent compensation schemes are ef-
fective,77 and there is reason to question whether and how promises
of additional compensation motivate CEOs. Pay for performance
makes the most sense when the link between compensation and per-
formance is clear. For instance, paying workers by the amount of
their output surely motivates workers to increase their output. The
output of CEOs is not so easily measured; the success or failure of
the firms that they manage depends, in part at least, on the quality
of the decisions that they make. So the relevant inquiry is whether
performance-based pay improves those decisions, and there is little
72. See Share and Share Unalike, supra note 65, at 19.
73. See id.
74. See Robert Dean Ellis, Equity Derivatives, Executive Compensation, and
Agency Costs, 35 Hous. L. REV. 399, 441 (1998).
75. See infra notes 150-156 and accompanying text.
76. Share and Share Unalike, supra note 65, at 20 (quoting Kevin Murphy,
Executive Compensation, in A HANDBOOK OF LABOUR ECONOMICS (Orley Ashen-
felter & David Card, eds. 1998)).
77. See Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based
Compensation Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 227, 239-41 (1999).
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reason to assume that better decisions, as opposed to simply more
decisions, will be made.
Nevertheless, the operating assumption has been that contin-
gent compensation will provide the necessary motivation. 8 A recent
article by Professor Stabile raises some important questions about
that assumption, based on research in psychology. 9 This research
suggests that the typical performance-based pay plan, which awards
stock options for the achievement of certain goals, is poorly struc-
tured because it "does not serve as a sufficient motivator of execu-
tive performance."8' "The reasons for this," Stabile says, "include
high base salaries, the failure to distinguish between individual and
group performance, insufficiently high performance barriers, and
manipulative behavior."8'
Another implication of this conclusion is that very large option
grants can be counter-productive as the incentive effect that they
were supposed to create is diminished. This effect is exacerbated if
the exercise price is the grant price because the executive does not
have to do much to realize a large return. Yet this describes the op-
tions that are becoming increasingly common and generating the
huge pay outs to CEOs.8 '2  Many critics have argued that option
grants should carry an exercise price above the market price at the
date of grant and above some price that reflects the general increase
in the stock market.' For accounting reasons,8 and possibly other
reasons as well, firms have typically avoided such "performance op-
tions," yet such options seem sensible and find support in social sci-
ence literature. Thus, large corporations find themselves firmly
committed to performance-based plans that may not be providing
the incentives sought by them, yet have significant long-term costs
to their shareholders.
II. STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES OF THE BOARD AS AN EXPLANATION
FOR CEO PAY
Regardless of what comparative measure of evaluating CEO pay
78. Indeed, executive compensation in excess of $1 million is not deductible
unless performance-based, suggesting that Congress believes that performance-
based plans motivate executives to create shareholder value. See infra notes
150-156 and accompanying text.
79. Stabile, supra note 77, at 239-41.
80. Id. at 260.
81. Id.
82. See discussion supra note 46 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Clawson & Klein, supra note 11, at 31; Stabile, supra note 77,
at 274.
84. Stock options with an exercise price equal to the market price on the
date of issue do not result in a charge against earnings. However, if the price is
not at market, under applicable accounting standards, the firm may have a
later charge to earnings. See Stabile, supra note 77, at 276-78 (describing in
detail the accounting aspects of stock options).
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the critic chooses, the overarching explanation, or story, is that the
CEO essentially controls the process by which his or her compensa-
tion is determined." The CEO, presumably, "hand picks" the out-
side directors for board service, 8 including service on a compensa-
tion committee. The committee, in turn, is advised by a consultant
selected by, and beholden to, the CEO.88 The analysis concludes that
the "captured committee" and the "captured board" are simply inca-
pable of bargaining hard with the CEO and, as a result, inevitably
overcompensate the CEO.89 A variant of this story posits that the
board and compensation committee consist of CEOs of other compa-
nies who have an interest in high CEO pay.90 Challenges to this
story, whether empirical or theoretical, are rare. There are, how-
ever, grounds to doubt it.
As a preliminary matter, boards are far more independent of
CEOs today than they were, say, twenty years ago when concerns
about CEO pay became newsworthy, and this is particularly so since
the early 1990s.91 Independent nominating and compensation com-
85. See CRYSTAL, supra note 2, at 42-50.
86. The passive role of directors has been the prevailing view for decades.
See JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY
OF AimRICA'S CORPORATE BOARDs 1 (1989); MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH &
REALITY 1 (1971); ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MiNow, POWER AND
AccouNTABITrY 77-79 (1991).
87. See Charles A. O'Reilly III et al., CEO Compensation as Tournament
and Social Comparison: A Tale of Two Theories, 33 J. ADMIIN. SO. Q. 257, 270
(1988).
88. See CRYSTAL, supra note 2, at 43-46, 49.
89. See Elson, supra note 7, at 656-59.
90. See O'Reilly et al., supra note 87, at 262 (discussing the social compari-
son theory).
91. See Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors
and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUI. L. REV.
1283, 1286 (1998) (stating that "Emlany boards of large companies operate in a
different mode than they did a few short years ago"). The authors also describe
the evolution of the board from passivity to active monitors, which they attrib-
ute to efforts by organizations such as the Business Roundtable, the American
Law Institute, the National Association of Corporate Directors, the Conference
Board, and the American Bar Association in publishing recommendations re-
garding corporate governance and the initiatives of a few large corporations to
change governance structures and competitive pressures as the effectiveness of
independent boards becomes more apparent. See id. at 1288-89. According to
the authors, boards responded to pressures from institutional investors, take-
over firms, and judicial decisions, such as Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990), which recognized the importance of inde-
pendent, well-informed boards of directors. See id. at 1285 & n.11.
Korn/Ferry International, a large executive search firm, periodically stud-
ies the composition of boards of directors and related aspects of corporate man-
agement. See Korn/Ferry International, New Korn/Ferry International Study
Points to Dramatic Changes in America's Corporate Boardrooms over Past 25
Years (visited Feb. 15, 2000) <http://www.kornferry.com/bordchng.htm>. The
firm's website includes a summary of its latest survey on board composition,
which notes the increasing independence of boards:
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
mittees are now common, particularly on stock exchange listed com-
panies.92 If anything, the story is based on a somewhat outdated
view of corporate governance. Second, the story does not at all ac-
count for the pay packages of incoming CEOs, who, by definition,
could not have captured the board yet receive large pay packages.
The oft-cited example of Michael Eisner's pay package at Disney il-
lustrates some of these factors. His reported pay in 1993 of $203
million (which nearly equaled his combined pay for the preceding
five years) astounded many people but reflected the value of options
granted over nearly a decade at Disney, during which time Disney's
stock price rose more than six-fold.93 Eisner negotiated this with a
board he did not control, and it was the sort of deal that sharehold-
ers should applaud.
Third, the story depends on overbearing CEOs and timid boards
in literally hundreds of public companies. The CEO must be able to:
a) cause the nominating committee to nominate only individuals fa-
vorable to him, b) cause the board to appoint patsies to the compen-
sation committee, and then c) dominate the compensation commit-
tee. Is this plausible? Are corporate boards heavily populated by
individuals who simultaneously have the credentials to direct
multibillion-dollar corporations but no capacity to exercise inde-
pendent judgment when the issue is CEO compensation? A perspec-
tive on this issue is provided by a recent study suggesting that the
boards of U.S. and Japanese companies exercise similar control over
Korn/Ferry's 1998 survey of directors shows that the average U.S.
board is dominated by outside directors who hold nine of 11 director
seats-leaving only two seats for inside directors. Furthermore, com-
panies increasingly are shying away from having those directors who
do consulting, legal or other work from serving on the board.
This represents a considerable shift from 1973, when our survey
found that nearly a quarter of U.S. boards were composed of between
16 and 25 members. More than half the respondents also reported
that between four and six inside directors were employed by the cor-
poration and another one or two were consultants to the corporation.
Ten years ago, the average board was made up of 14 members-four
of whom were insiders.
Id. This survey also disclosed the increasing use of nominating committees.
See id. Seventy-five percent of all boards had nominating committees in 1998,
compared to just two percent in 1973. See id.
92. See Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 91, at 1286 & n.15 (stating that
40.2% of companies have completely independent nominating committees).
Under the current tax code, publicly-held companies are virtually required to
have independent compensation committees; otherwise compensation paid to
executive officers in excess of $1,000,000 would not be deductible. See infra
note 150 and accompanying text. Similarly, under SEC rules, if an independent
board committee approves a stock option plan, shareholder approval is not re-
quired for purposes of an exemption under section 16(b) of the Securities Act of
1934. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(d) (1999).
93. See Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, Executive Compensation: The Importance of
Context, in VALUE FOR MONEY: ExEcuTIVE COMPENSATION IN THE 1990s 88, 106-
07 (Edward Iacobucci ed., 1996).
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their CEOs." Steven Kaplan examined "the relation of top man-
agement turnover and cash compensation (salary and bonus) to
earnings levels, changes in earnings, stock returns, and sales
growth in large [U.S. and] Japanese companies in the 1980s."9'5 He
concluded that:
Japanese management turnover and compensation respond to
all four types of performance measures, and the responses are
generally similar to those in the United States. Top executive
turnover is negatively related and cash compensation is posi-
tively related to earnings, stock, and sales performance. In
most cases, the sensitivities in the two countries are not statis-
tically different.96
In the context of CEO pay, this study might provide evidence that,
relative to Japan, U.S. CEOs do not dominate their boards.97 The
pay and turnover of CEOs in both countries are similarly sensitive
to standard measures of performance." If the conventional wisdom
that U.S. CEOs virtually dictate their compensation were true, then
we might expect them to have similar influence on turnover deci-
sions. In other words, we would expect turnover in the United
States to be less sensitive to performance data than in Japan if U.S.
CEOs had so much influence over their boards. However, that ap-
pears not to be the case.
More importantly, a recent empirical study failed to confirm the
hypothesis that "captured" directors or the presence of other CEOs
on a compensation committee are correlated with higher levels or
changes in CEO pay.99 This study examined "multiple measure-
ments of board interdependence at the committee level and multiple
measurements of CEO compensation over several years.""9 The
authors studied a random sample of 200 manufacturing companies
on the 1992 Fortune 500 list.10' The study was unique because the
authors looked at changes in both contingent and non-contingent
94. See Kaplan, supra note 24, at 510 (presenting a study of the relation-
ship between executive turnover and compensation and firm performance in
U.S. and Japanese firms).
95. Id. at 511.
96. Id. at 512.
97. See id. at 541.
98. See id. Kaplan did find, however, that turnover and compensation in
Japan are relatively more sensitive to negative earnings, possibly reflecting the
role of bank monitoring in Japan. Id.
99. See Catherine M. Daily et al., Compensation Committee Composition as
a Determinant of CEO Compensation, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 209, 214 (1998).
100. Id. at 210. The authors defined "interdependent directors" as
"[dlirectors appointed during the tenure of an incumbent CEO." Id. at 211.
This term is thus equivalent to the term "captured directors" used in the text,
which suggests directors who are beholden to the CEO for their board positions
and, presumably, easily influenced by the CEO.
101. See id. at 212.
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compensation over a three-year period on the theory that the deci-
sions of a compensation committee with respect to contingent com-
pensation (and, to some degree, non-contingent compensation) are
only apparent over time."2 The results were surprising:
1. Higher proportions of affiliated directors on the compen-
sation committee did not necessarily mean higher levels
of CEO pay.10 3 (The authors define "affiliated directors"
as directors with personal and/or professional relation-
ships with the firm or its management.)
104
2. There was weak statistical support for the hypothesis
that a higher proportion of "captured directors" on a
compensation committee leads to higher CEO pay.'05
(The authors did not use the term "captured directors;"
instead, they employed the term "interdependent direc-
tors," which they defined as "[d]irectors appointed dur-
ing the tenure of an incumbent CEO.")06
3. Counter to expectations, "[a] high proportion of CEOs on
a compensation committee was associated with a lower
level of change" in total compensation. 1
7
Assessing these findings, the authors concluded: "In sum, these
findings suggest that the presence on compensation committees of
high proportions of the directors most implicated in discussions of
excessive executive compensation does not result in higher levels of
CEO compensation in subsequent years."' One can only speculate
on why this is so. One obvious explanation is that directors take
their responsibilities seriously and act in the shareholders' interests,
not the interest of the CEO. Regardless of the explanation, however,
this study suggests caution in mandating reforms to corporate
boards. If the relationship between a director and the CEO does not
explain the directors' actions on compensation matters, then speci-
fying the characteristics of directors who might serve on a compen-
sation committee or board, with the expectation that a change will
occur in CEO compensation, is unwarranted.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 214.
104. Id. at 212.
105. See id. at 214-15. In particular, the authors hypothesized that a higher
proportion of interdependent directors on the compensation committee would
lead to higher non-contingent and total pay in 1992 (the second year) and a
higher change in non-contingent pay in 1992. See id. at 211. They concluded
that these hypotheses were "not strongly supported." Id. at 214. John E. Core,
Robert W. Holthausen, and David F. Larcker similarly concluded that "CEO
compensation is higher when.., there is a greater percentage of the board
composed of outside directors." Core et al., supra note 56, at 372.
106. Daily et al., supra note 99, at 211.
107. Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
108. Id.
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III. SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE MARKET IS FUNCTIONING
To this point, I have considered the arguments that CEOs are
overcompensated and tried to demonstrate that neither the theoreti-
cal arguments nor the data unambiguously support the proposition
that CEOs are overpaid. This analysis, of course, does not prove
that there is an efficient and functioning market setting CEO pay at
an appropriate level. There are, however, some indications that a
market is functioning. For instance, several studies have found that
CEO pay is positively correlated to the complexity of the organiza-
tion that the CEO is managing.'09 One recent study focused on the
relationship between, among other things, the degree of a firm's in-
ternationalization and the level and structure of CEO compensa-
tion."' Building on earlier work, the authors described the in-
creased complexity of managing an international firm, noting the
spatial complexity associated with geographic dispersion of sales,
assets, and personnel."' It is also more difficult and costly for the
board to monitor the firm. The authors hypothesized and demon-
strated that the pay of CEOs in such firms is higher because the
skills needed are a "scarce and valuable resource"" and because pay
reflects a higher proportion of long-term compensation, indicating
the difficulty in monitoring the CEO's performance. These findings
suggest that market factors may be operating: firms face a smaller
pool of qualified executives and therefore offer a more attractive pay
package to attract an acceptable CEO. The captured board story
does not explain why companies with complex businesses and or-
ganizations pay their CEOs more.
There are other indications that the market is operating. A
study of data from 120 firms in 1977-81 disclosed that CEOs re-
cruited from outside of the firms are paid significantly more than
CEOs recruited internally."' We would expect this sort of result in a
competitive market. In fact, in the market for professional athletes,
the athletes are frequently paid significantly more when they be-
come "free agents." Another indication that CEOs are not overcom-
pensated comes from a 1985 study of the stock price reaction to the
unexpected death of a firm's CEO."4 This study demonstrated that,
109. See Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, Executive Compensation: A Reassessment and
a Future Research Agenda, in 12 RESEARCH IN PERSONNEL AND HuiAN
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 161, 178 (1994).
110. See Win. Gerard Sanders & Mason A. Carpenter, Internationalization
and Firm Governance: The Roles of CEO Compensation, Top Team Composition,
and Board Structure, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 158, 158 (1998). The authors also
found that the more internationalized firms tended to have larger top manage-
ment teams and separate CEOs and board chairs. See id. at 172.
111. See id. at 162.
112. Id.
113. See Deckop, supra note 31, at 225.
114. See generally W. Bruce Johnson et al., An Analysis of the Stock Price
Reaction to Sudden Executive Deaths: Implications for the Managerial Labor
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on average, the market reacted negatively to the news, suggesting
that investors view the CEO as adding value to the firm."' If the
CEO could be replaced with someone earning less or performing
more effectively, we would expect the stock price, on average, to rise.
It did not.
Against this empirical research-which does not resolve the
question of whether CEOs are overcompensated-I next consider the
reforms recommended to deal with the supposed problem. The im-
portant inquiry here is whether reforms will accomplish their in-
tended purpose and, if so, at what cost to the corporation.
IV. ATTEMPTS AT REFORM
A. Judicial Activism
The foregoing discussion, which suggests the difficulty of de-
termining whether CEOs are paid excessively, highlights the prob-
lem that courts would face were this a litigated issue.1 In part for
this reason, the courts have shied away from cases alleging exces-
sive compensation, instead deferring to the judgment of the direc-
tors under the business judgment rule. 7 Nonetheless, from time to
time, academics have called on the judiciary to play a role."'8 Profes-
sor Detlev Vagts, after describing the roles that directors and share-
holders might play in "keep[ing] compensation from getting out of
control,"1 ' recommended that, when they fail, the courts should step
in and, using "comparative data," adjust the level of compensation.""
The problem with this approach is, of course, that the use of com-
parative data may be a source of the problem and not its solution.
Market, 7 J. AcCT. & EcoN. 151 (1985) (investigating the effect that the common
stock price reaction to a CEO's unexpected death has upon shareholder wealth).
115. See id. at 162-64.
116. Indeed, the judiciary long ago recognized the difficulties a court faces in
this area. The New York Supreme Court, in a 1941 decision, summarized the
difficulties well:
Assuming, arguendo, that the compensation should be revised, what
yardstick is to be employed? Who or what is to supply the measuring-
rod? The conscience of equity? Equity is but another name for human
being temporarily judicially robed. He is not omnipotent or omnis-
cient. Can equity be so arrogant as to hold that it knows more about
managing [a] corporation than its stockholders?
Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 679 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
117. For a discussion of the judicial approach to compensation cases, see
Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a Modest
Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. Rev. 201, 210-15 (1996).
118. See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the
Failure of Corporate Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 46-83 (1993); Vagts, supra
note 8, at 275-76; Joshua A. Kreinberg, Note, Reaching Beyond Performance
Compensation in Attempts to Own the Corporate Executive, 45 DuKE L.J. 138,
172-82 (1995).
119. Vagts, supra note 8, at 275.
120. See id. at 276.
[Vol. 35
2000] THE CONUNDRUM OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 21
Were courts to rely on such data, they likely would not be comfort-
able setting compensation and, if they were, they would be deluged
with litigation. In any case, judicial involvement in cases involving
excessive compensation typically has been limited to cases involving
stock option grants, golden parachutes, and pension grants, where
the legal issues were limited to consideration or contract interpreta-
tion, matters that the courts feel competent to handle.
121
A recent example of such involvement was Sanders v. Wang,1 22 a
highly publicized Delaware Court of Chancery case involving Com-
puter Associates. The corporation, in a plan approved by its share-
holders, authorized the board to grant up to 6,000,000 shares of the
company's common stock to three key officers of the company if cer-
tain performance goals were attained.123 Interestingly, these goals
related to the company's stock price, 124 just the sort of incentive plan
that pay-for-performance advocates favor. The problem arose be-
cause the plan did not provide for an adjustment of the number of
shares that might be granted in the event of a stock split, which oc-
curred here.12 The board, acting under a general provision of the
plan that authorized it to interpret and administer the plan, in-
creased the stock award to take the splits into account, so that the
officers received 20.25 million shares
126 worth over $1.08 billion.127
Shareholders, in a derivative action, challenged the board's ac-
tion as a breach of the plan (which the court characterized as a con-
tract between the board and the shareholders) and a violation of the
board's fiduciary duties. 128 The court held in favor of the plaintiffs
on the theory that the plan's terms were plain and unambiguous: it
authorized grants of up to 6,000,000 shares and no more. 29 Defen-
dants' arguments that the intent of the plan was to award the par-
ticipating officers 3.75% of the company's equity if the performance
goals were obtained was rejected by the court. 13 Similarly, the court
found no inconsistency between the provision specifying the number
of shares and the provision empowering the board to administer and
interpret the plan. 3'
The court likely was influenced by the sheer size of the award,
noting that "even under the strictest reading of the Plan, the three
Participants will together still receive nearly $320 million. $320
121. See Loewenstein, supra note 117, at 215 & n.71.
122. No. 16640, 1999 WL 1044880 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1999).
123. See id. at *1-:2.
124. See id. at *2.
125. See id. There were three separate "three for two" stock splits. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id. at *4.
128. See id. at :2-:*3.




million is no mere bagatelle."132 If the size of the award influenced
the court, then the outcome is unfortunate. The defendants pointed
out that, had there been a reverse stock split, surely the directors
would have been obliged to adjust downward the number of shares
that might be awarded under the plan, but the court did not think
such considerations relevant in light of the plain meaning rule. 33
While an examination of the plain meaning rule is beyond the scope
of this Article, its application often frustrates the intent of the par-
ties, prompting many courts and commentators to view it with skep-
ticism.134 The effect of the court's ruling may be to jeopardize other
similar plans where the drafters failed to include an adjustment
clause, even if the intent was to protect the beneficiaries of the plan
from the adverse effects of a stock split.
Finally, the court's characterization of the plan as a "contract"
between the board and the shareholders is strained."" The plan
seems better characterized as a contract between the corporation
and the participants under the plan. As such, the board clearly was
granted broad authority to interpret and administer the plan to act
in place of the shareholders who, having approved the plan, dele-
gated the implementation of the plan to the board on their behalf.
In other words, the responsibility of the board with respect to the
plan does not differ from its normal responsibilities to manage the
business and affairs of the firm in the interests of the shareholders,
as the firm's residual claimants. The courts typically defer to busi-
ness judgments of the board when it acts in that capacity. By char-
acterizing the plan as something different, the court was able to
consider the merits of the board's decision, which it found lacking. 6
My point is not just that Sanders is a questionable decision, al-
though it is that. Rather, my concern is that judicial review of com-
pensation decisions is troublesome when undertaken directly or in-
directly. Courts should resist the temptation to weigh in on these
issues because doing so jeopardizes other prudential concerns.
Sanders may have created an unfortunate precedent under the
business judgment rule.
B. Increased Disclosure
Another reform calls for increased disclosure of executive com-
pensation. The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has
dealt with this issue more than once, most recently in 1992.137 The
132. Id. at *7.
133. See id.
134. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging
Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968).
135. Sanders, 1999 WL 1044880, at *5-*6.
136. See id. at *6-*7.
137. See generally Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 48126
(1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240 & 249) (outlining amend-
ments to executive compensation disclosure requirements intended to make
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current rules require disclosure of a good deal of information, as
much as any conscientious shareholder is likely to want.138 The rules
were promulgated in an atmosphere of intense public interest over
executive compensation and, thus, may reflect a political attempt at
limiting compensation."9 Some commentators have speculated that
disclosure has caused directors to limit performance-based compen-
sation plans and levels of compensation out of fear that the resulting
compensation would generate criticism, 40 and there is reason to be-
lieve that disclosure might have a restraining effect on the level of
compensation. With extensive disclosure, shareholders inclined to
monitor the firm's performance will have a lower cost of monitoring.
In firms with ownership concentrated in large institutional inves-
tors-which are generally the largest firms with the highest CEO
compensation-we might expect those investors to pressure the
board on compensation issues. Indeed, the California Public Em-
ployees Retirement System ("CalPERS") has gained a reputation for
doing so.'4' This reputation, in turn, increases CalPERS' ability to
influence other firms in which it has invested. Finally, disclosure
obligations may encourage compensation committees to exercise
particular care in crafting their plans in light of possible public scru-
tiny. So, disclosure encourages better compensation plans (in terms
of aligning managers' interests with the shareholders') and restraint
on the level of compensation.
On the other hand, there is reason to believe that disclosure
may have the effect of increasing compensation levels.142 Remember,
one of the intended effects of disclosure is to encourage boards to
make pay plans more sensitive to, and thus contingent upon, per-
formance.' Boards or compensation committees negotiating with
the CEO are motivated to increase the contingent portion of the
compensation disclosure clearer, more concise, and more useful to sharehold-
ers).
138. See Loewenstein, supra note 117, at 216 for a summary of these rules.
139. The SEC's Chief Economist defended the rules "as a moderate course
aimed at diffusing some of the political rhetoric about executive pay." Tax Cap
on Executive Pay Likely, Former SEC Chief Economist Predicts, 24 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1739 (Nov. 13, 1992).
140. See Jensen & Murphy, Performance Pay, supra note 5, at 262.
141. As a result of the 1992 changes in the federal proxy rules, shareholders
have greater freedom to communicate their positions on voting matters. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l)(2)(iv) (1997). As a result, CalPERS has created a web site
to announce its votes and policies on voting. See CalPERS, CalPERS Share-
owner Forum (visited Feb. 15, 2000) <http'//www.calpers-governance.
org/forumhome.asp>. Such communications may pressure boards to respond to
shareholder demands. See generally Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation
Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59
(1992) (discussing the power of institutional investors to influence compensa-
tion plans).
142. See Iacobucci, supra note 34, at 490. I have drawn on the work of Pro-
fessor Edward M. Iacobucci for this theory.
143. See id. at 505.
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compensation package, possibly at the expense of the fixed, non-
contingent portion of the package, but the CEO is likely to be risk-
averse. This risk aversion makes the CEO resistant to lowering the
fixed portion of his or her compensation to substitute an equally
valuable, but more risky, performance-based plan.' The result is
that disclosure pushes firms to more contingent pay (without a cor-
responding reduction in non-contingent pay), and the contingent
pay,145 if it does what it is supposed to do, motivates the CEO to
manage the firm in a way that increases its return to sharehold-
ers.146 Thus, higher compensation is inevitable and should occur
without regard to the "ratcheting effect" discussed above. 147 Profes-
sor Murphy put it well: "[Slatisfying shareholders by increasing pay-
performance sensitivities ultimately implies higher, not lower, levels
of pay ... 148 Moreover, as most contingent pay is in the form of
stock options, the value of which is reported when exercised, the list
of "top earners" is skewed as their compensation reflects options
granted and share gains over a period of time. Finally, the effect is
enhanced during periods of broad stock market increases like we are
currently experiencing.
The possibility that increased disclosure increases compensa-
tion levels is an example of the potentially unintended effects of
regulation.' While the SEC is unlikely to reverse itself and lessen
the amount of disclosure, it is clear that disclosure should not be re-
garded as an effective limitation on compensation.
C. Tax Reform
Tax reform reflects another governmental response to the "ex-
ecutive compensation" crisis. At about the time the SEC increased
disclosure requirements, Congress amended the tax code to limit the
deductibility of compensation in excess of $1,000,000 paid to execu-
tive officers of publicly-held companies unless the excess compensa-
tion is paid pursuant to performance-based plans meeting certain
criteria.5 As in the case of disclosure reform, tax reform is unlikely
144. See id. at 508-09. Risk aversion aside, another factor that makes the
CEO resistant to substituting non-contingent pay for equally valuable contin-
gent pay is the "endowment effect." See id. Individuals generally are unwilling
to give up something they have for something of equal value, classical economic
theory to the contrary notwithstanding. See id.
145. See id. at 510.
146. See id. at 505; see also Jensen & Murphy, CEO Incentives, supra note 5,
at 139 (recognizing that contingent increases in CEO compensation result in
potential gains to shareholders because CEOs would probably employ greater
effort).
147. Supra text accompanying notes 33-41.
148. Murphy, supra note 32, at 714.
149. Cf Richard A. Epstein, Lawsuits Aimed at Guns Probably Won't Hit
Crime, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1999, at A26 (noting the unintended consequences of
seeking to limit the availability of firearms).
150. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
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to limit compensation, and it may fuel the increase of compensation.
Boards are encouraged to adopt incentive plans tied to stock price.
Generally, this means stock option plans with large option grants
provide incentives and align executive and shareholder interests.
Again, if the plans do what they are supposed to do--motivate man-
agement-compensation should rise. Moreover, if these plans are on
top of existing compensation plans, compensation may well rise
dramatically, particularly if stock prices generally are rising. In-
deed, that appears to be the case."'
The law also has another feature likely to cause an increase in
compensation. Under the legislation, a plan qualifies as perform-
ance-based only if, among other things,'52 the plan's performance
goals are non-discretionary.5 3 However, IRS regulations permit dis-
cretion to reduce, but not increase, a performance bonus.5 Conse-
quently, to approximate its pre-legislation discretion, compensation
plans may provide a larger bonus pool than they otherwise might
have prior to the legislation and then provide that individual awards
may, in the committee's discretion, be reduced. Having created a
larger pool, however, there will be pressure on the committee to
award the entire pool or, at least, to award more than it would have
under prior plans. Thus, compensation may be increased,'55 and
there is some evidence that this is occurring." In short, Congres-
sional efforts to limit compensation through the tax code are proving
to be weak and ineffectual, at best.
D. Shareholder Involvement
Shareholders can express their concern over executive compen-
sation in several different ways. First, they can sell their stock or
refuse to invest in companies that, in their view, overcompensate
their executives (or any employees, for that matter). Increasingly,
however, institutional shareholders are finding this option unattrac-
tive. If one believes that excessive pay is pervasive in corporate
America, then exiting one company would logically mean exiting the
§ 13,211, 107 Stat. 312, 449 (1993) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(m)).
Performance-based plans must meet the following criteria: 1) the goal was de-
termined by a committee of the board of directors comprised solely of two or
more "outside" directors; 2) the shareholders approved the goals by a majority
vote; and 3) prior to the payment of the performance compensation, the board's
compensation committee verified the propriety of the payment. See id. See gen-
erally Loewenstein, supra note 117, at 217-21 (critiquing the amendments);
Kevin J. Ryan, Note, Rethinking Section 162(m)'s Limitation on the Deduction
of Executive Compensation: A Review of the Commentary, 15 VA. TAX REV. 371,
379 (1995) (describing the amendments as they were proposed).
151. See Loewenstein, supra note 117, at 219-20.
152. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, I.R.C. § 162(m) (1998).
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See Murphy, supra note 32, at 739.
156. See Loewenstein, supra note 117, at 218 & n.80.
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market. For institutions whose charter or announced investment
policy includes the equities of large U.S. companies, or for individual
investors who view the market as an integral part of their invest-
ment plans, this obviously is not an option.
Second, shareholders can communicate with their boards or
fellow shareholders either directly157 or through formal proposals.
The latter can take the form of proposals under Rule 14a-8 of the
federal proxy rules. These proposals would not be self-executing and
only constitute recommendations to the board, or bylaw amend-
ments, which would become part of the governance structure of the
corporation.15 Bylaw amendments, especially those dealing with
pay issues, are a relatively recent phenomenon. In 1998, the SEC
took the view that shareholders could use Rule 14a-8 to propose by-
law amendments related to pay practices. 9 In 1992, the SEC had
reached a similar view with respect to non-binding shareholder pro-
posals dealing with senior executive compensation.6 ° In each case,
the issue was whether such proposals would be excludable as relat-
ing to the ordinary business operations of the corporation."" Now,
depending on the applicable state law and the corporation's articles
of incorporation, shareholders can use either means to affect pay
practices.6 2
Whether as bylaw amendments or non-binding recommenda-
tions, shareholder proposals in this area generally have not fared
well. The Investor Responsibility Research Center tracked ninety-
two shareholder proposals dealing with compensation issues, in-
cluding director compensation, in 1998.63 For present purposes,
157. Institutional shareholders frequently express their concerns directly to
corporate boards on matters of corporate governance, including executive com-
pensation. See James E. Heard, Executive Compensation: Perspective of the In-
stitutional Investor, 63 U. CiN. L. REv. 749, 761 (1995).
158. Shareholders can also express their concern over executive compensa-
tion policies by voting against management-sponsored proposals, such as those
seeking approval of stock option plans or voting against management's slate of
directors in a so-called "Just Vote No" campaign. Negative votes on stock option
plans have increased in recent years, prompting management to avoid seeking
shareholder approval, if possible. See Wagner & Wagner, supra note 65, at 10-
11. See generally Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for
Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1993) (regard-
ing the "Just Vote No" approach).
159. See General DataComm Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1998
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,481, at 78,471 (Dec. 9, 1998).
160. See Reebok Int'l Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-92 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,131, at 79,338 (Mar. 16, 1992).
161. See id. at 79,337, 79,338; General DataComm Indus., Inc., supra note
159, at 78,475, 78,473.
162. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder
Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1046, 1047-48
(1999).
163. See INVESTOR RESPONsIBILITY RESEARCH CTR., SUMMARY OF 1998 U.S.
SHAREHOLDER REsoLuTioNs 2 (Feb. 3, 1999).
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only three categories of proposals are of particular interest. These
categories deal with the amount or manner of payment of executive
compensation: proposals that restrict executive compensation,1&I
proposals that require approval of executive compensation,1" and
proposals that would restrict repricing of options without share-
holder approval.16 The average vote for these proposals was 9.2%,
13.6%, and 27.6%, respectively.1 7 Except for the third category,
dealing with repricing of options, the average vote indicates that
shareholder concern about the level of executive compensation is not
high.16 The paucity of proposals among shareholders also is reflec-
tive of a general malaise; there were only fifteen proposals to restrict
executive compensation, down from twenty-nine proposals in 1997.69
While the repricing issue reflects some shareholder concern, there
were only three proposals raising the issue, and they may have re-
lated to situations in which repricing was particularly abusive, at
least in the eyes of activist shareholders.
The apparent inconsistency between the outrage expressed in
the popular press and the lack of shareholder voice may have sev-
eral explanations. The obvious explanation is that, except for a few
instances in which poorly performing companies repriced the stock
options of their executives, shareholders generally are pleased with
the compensation policies of their companies. Alternatively, one
might argue that shareholders are apathetic and often fail to open
their proxy materials, much less take the time to complete a proxy
card and mail it back to the company. Thus, one should not infer
much from the low vote totals or the lack of proposals. While there
is truth to this explanation-public companies often struggle to get a
quorum at their meetings-there is also reason to doubt the expla-
nation. Some corporate governance proposals frequently are pro-
posed and well received. For instance, there were seven proposals in
1998 recommending the repeal of classified boards, receiving, on av-
erage, a 47.3% approval.170 There were thirteen proposals to repeal
or vote on poison pills, receiving, on average, 57.4% approval. 71 This
suggests that, when shareholders perceive an issue as affecting the
value of their investment, they will take the time to express their
preferences even if, as is the case in shareholder proposals, their
preferences are not binding. If true, this means that shareholders
164. This includes proposals to restrict executive compensation, cap execu-
tive pay, and link executive pay to performance. See Robert W. Newbury, Issues
Raised in 1998 Give Way to an Active 1999 Proxy Season, CORP. GOVERNANCE
BULLETIN, July-Oct. 1998, at 3.
165. See INVESTORRESPONSIBIL1TY=ESEARCH CTR., supra note 163, at 2.
166. See id. at 2.
167. See id.
168. See id.




do not perceive executive compensation issues as affecting share
values.
I have recommended elsewhere that shareholders should vote




The concept is that much of the speculation of shareholder discon-
tent can be confirmed or denied if there is a shareholder vote. While
the sparse data available, as noted above, suggests that sharehold-
ers are not discontented, this proposal would provide more convinc-
ing data. My guess is that shareholders understand the relationship
between pay and performance and will not vote against a package
that provides the right incentives, irrespective of the potential size
of the proposal.1 73 If shareholders do vote not to ratify, then a sig-
nificant message is sent to the board, which would be difficult to ig-
nore. This is especially so if, as a matter of practice, shareholders
generally ratify the package. If the shareholders fail to ratify what
is otherwise a sound plan, in the sense that it provides the right in-
centives to management, then they will bear the burden of their de-
cision.
In any event, there is some reason to believe that management
pays attention to shareholder votes on compensation matters. A re-
cent article by Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin examined
the effect that shareholder votes on compensation proposals had on
future compensation practices. 74 They found that companies tar-
geted with compensation proposals tend to increase CEO pay the
following year much less than comparable firms not receiving pro-
posals.173 This suggests that boards are sensitive to shareholder
concerns and that an annual advisory vote might influence corpo-
rate policies.
CONCLUSION
A review of the now voluminous research on executive compen-
sation suggests a number of unresolved conundrums:
1. Do the empirical studies of CEO compensation establish
that CEOs are overpaid, or is the market functioning?
172. See Loewenstein, supra note 117, at 221-23.
173. Indeed, the Computer Associates plan, though controversial in its im-
plementation, received shareholder approval. See supra notes 122-36 and ac-
companying text.
174. Thomas & Martin, supra note 162.
175. See id. at 1022. The authors also found that targeted firms tended to
shift CEO compensation more toward cash and less in terms of long-term incen-
tive compensation. See id. If true, this may mean that boards shy away from
performance-based compensation presumably because it can result in such
large payoffs for executives. If so, this might be an unfortunate consequence of
shareholder activism, as Jensen and Murphy predicted. Jensen & Murphy, Per-
formance Pay, supra note 5, at 262 (hypothesizing "that political forces operat-
ing both in the public sector and inside organizations limit large payoffs for ex-
ceptional performance").
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2. Does the relatively higher pay of U.S. CEOs, in com-
parison to their foreign counterparts, reflect an eco-
nomically efficient solution to the agency problem?
3. Does greater disclosure of executive compensation result
in an increase or decrease in compensation?
4. Does correlating CEO pay to accounting goals add to
long-term shareholder wealth more effectively than cor-
relating pay to share prices?
5. If CEOs exercise undue influence over their boards, why
are these same boards capable of removing poor per-
forming CEOs, but incapable of compensating them
within reasonable limits?
6. Do tax laws that encourage performance-based pay pro-
vide the proper incentives for their participants?
7. Have performance-based plans shifted too much equity
to management?
8. If CEO pay is excessive, why do shareholders, when
given the opportunity, fail to express dissatisfaction?
The controversy that accompanies each of these problems indi-
cates both that further research is in order and that governmental
solutions are not. While many empirical studies that I reviewed in
preparing this Article had suggestions for further empirical studies,
none suggested that the principal actors be interviewed to deter-
mine what boards were trying to achieve with their compensation
plans, why they chose the plans that they did, and how they tested
the effectiveness of their plans. What seems to be lacking in this
area is an anthropological type of study, in which researchers would
study the firm from the inside, discussing with the compensation
committee and other directors how they arrived at their decisions,
examining what sorts of negotiations took place, and how various
performance measures influenced pay decisions.
Some theories are only, or at least best, verified by such re-
search. For instance, some researchers have speculated that boards
set CEO compensation very high to create a "tournament effect."176
The theory is that to motivate lower level managers, CEO pay is set
disproportionately high in relation to the next tier of managers."'
The chance of winning the "lottery," that is, the CEO pay, motivates
managers and is an efficient means to address the agency problem.
Researchers tested this theory by hypothesizing that, if the tourna-
ment effect explained compensation, then one would expect that the
176. See Edward Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-order Tournaments as Op-
timum Labor Contracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841, 841-42 (1981) (delivering one of
the early statements of the theory); O'Reilly et al., supra note 87, at 260 (con-
ducting an empirical test of the tournament theory).
177. See O'Reilly et al., supra note 87, at 260.
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larger the number of vice presidents in a firm, the greater the dif-
ference between average CEO and vice president pay levels. 78 The
hypothesis was easily tested, using data on executive compensation.
While one can doubt the soundness of the hypothesis,'79 the very na-
ture of the problem seems to compel an entirely different sort of
methodology. Asking compensation committees about the extent to
which concepts like the tournament effect influenced their thinking
would seem to be far more revealing than an empirical study of pay
differentials.
There is some precedent for this type of work; two legal anthro-
pologists studied how pension funds make investment decisions, in
part to test the conventional wisdom that money managers were
short-term oriented. 80 Their work was interesting and valuable.
Unhappily, this type of research, which can lead to valuable in-
sights, is not only ignored, but terribly out of fashion. Indeed, the
trend in corporate law is heavily in the direction of empirical work,
and law reviews increasingly are looking like quantitative manage-
ment journals. The area of executive compensation is one, however,
that would benefit from the use of other means of analysis, as tradi-
tional tools are unable to tell us the extent to which comparative ta-
bles or tax considerations influence compensation decisions, or re-
solve many of the other questions in this area. I suggest here one
such tool for further research.
178. See id. at 261.
179. The hypothesis seems to ignore the typical salary structure, in which
relatively high pay to the top tier of vice presidents may provide incentives to
the next tier, and so forth. The "prize" is thus not just the CEO pay, but possi-
bly other levels within the corporation.
180. See generally John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, The Culture of
Capital: An Anthropological Investigation of Institutional Investment, 70 N.C. L.
REV. 823 (1992) (using the qualitative method of anthropology to examine pen-
sion fund structure, investment strategy, and corporate decision-making).
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